

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

26 June 1962

Mr. Elder,

Pls. return to

In accordance with our telephone conversation this morning, attached is a copy of the Memorandum for Record covering Friday's visit with Perez & San Roman and two friends.

General Taylor would appreciate any comments CIA has on the allegations and complaints made by the Cubans.

I am also sending a copy to Dick Helms.

STAT



A. Parrott

Attachment

MORI/CDF Pages 2 & 3

*CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
DECISION APPLIED* *NSC WAIVER
APPLIES* - NO REFERRAL TO NSC

22 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Cubans

At the suggestion of the Attorney General, General Taylor met today with Roberto Angel Perez y San Roman. Also present were Enrique Llanso, Rafael Quintero Ibaria, and myself.

1. The Cubans said that within the past few days the Cuban security services (described by them simply as "G-2") had rounded up the national and provincial leaders of four or five resistance groups within Cuba, and that this had effectively wiped out the resistance movement. They said that the pattern indicated to them a high-level penetration or penetrations. They said that the task now is to compartment resistance groups and to speed up exfiltration for training and infiltration of such trainees, as well as of additional Cubans now outside the country.

2. The principal complaint these individuals had was that sizeable numbers of members of Cuban resistance groups are being exfiltrated for training, but that there is a very small flow back into Cuba. In other words, according to them, such individuals are brought to the Miami area and then simply sit for several months. They said that when they complain about this, "CIA" tells them there are insufficient facilities for training and, presumably, for infiltration.

3. Additionally, they complained that the boats which CIA has are not in good shape. (In this connection it is interesting to note that Llanso said, in response to General Taylor's question, that the boat which he says he has used for several missions has had no trouble whatever with Cuban Government patrol boats, and that a combination of radar and great speed has made it possible to operate with impunity.)

4. These men all said that what is necessary is to put people into Cuba quickly in order to start "a big action," in other words, a major revolt. They expressed confidence that infiltrated teams could bring this about. When questioned as to motivation of infiltrates for intelligence as opposed to guerrilla action, all three professed to find no problem. (This seemed unconvincing, however.) The standard complaint was also voiced that the Cubans have been used as instruments rather than the associates they wished to be. They said particularly that they wanted Cubans to work jointly with Americans on base communications. They also complained that not enough radio operators are available for infiltration.


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5. In answer to a question, Llanso said that the direction of small boat operations was good.

6. General Taylor asked whether these men were aware of a program to recruit Cubans into the U.S. Armed Forces. San Roman (as he seems to be known) replied that this would not be attractive because Cubans would feel they were simply lost for a number of years. They responded enthusiastically, however, to a hypothetical suggestion by General Taylor that it might conceivably be possible to enlist Cubans for four to six months training, and then put them on some kind of reserve list.

7. San Roman asked if General Taylor would get in touch with him to give him answers to the suggestions and complaints that he had made. General Taylor replied simply that he would think these over.



Thomas A. Farrott

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